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I. INTRODUCTION

And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword
before the king. And the king said, Divide the living child in two,
and give half to the one, and half to the other.1
∗ Student at the University of Akron School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Paul Richert,
Professor Bernadette Genetin, and Professor Tracy Thomas, for all of their support throughout the
writing and editing process. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the Akron Law Review for
all their hard work.
1. 1 Kings 3:24-25 (King Solomon faced the dreadful question of what to do when two
parents claim the same child).
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Some situations invoke the need for King Solomon’s wisdom more
2
aptly than others. In Castro v. United States, the Fifth Circuit faced a
very difficult choice. Monica Castro sued the federal government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),3 alleging the government’s
4
negligence caused the wrongful deportation of her baby daughter
5
R.M.G. The daughter remained in the custody of her undocumented
alien father, Omar Gallardo, when he was deported because he had the
6
baby in his possession when he was detained. The en banc court
upheld the District Court’s dismissal of the case based on the
discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which retains
the government’s immunity over claims where the government actor had
a choice.7 Although the statutes and regulations granting power to the
border patrol are silent, the court found it within the patrol’s discretion
8
to leave R.M.G. in Omar’s hands when he was deported. Further, the
Office of the Inspector General has stated that the policy of the
immigration system is not to deport U.S. citizens.9 Though the case was
10
decided on procedural grounds, it demonstrates the legal and human
consequences of the current gap in the immigration system. The Fifth
Circuit faced the problem of the single deportable parent: when one
parent is deportable and the other is not, the custody of the child
determines whether the child will be de facto deported with the
deportable parent. Unfortunately, without a custody decision from a
court, agents of the immigration system will be forced to make a de facto
custody determination without process and often without rationale.
2. Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
3. The federal government waived its sovereign immunity with the Federal Tort Claims Act
contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (2006).
4. From the outset, it is worth noting R.M.G. was not technically deported in the legal
sense—she was left in her father’s custody when he was deported, the term for which is “de facto
deportation.” See infra note 41.
5. Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth
Circuit in both appellate cases adopted the District Court’s findings of fact.
6. Id. at *9-11.
7. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (2006), the United States retains sovereign immunity over
“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
8. Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 at *31-34.
9. U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-09-15,
REMOVALS INVOLVING PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN (2009) (“OIG Report”).
10. The parties focused extensively on the procedural aspects of the case in their briefs. See
Brief for Appellant at 11-24, 35, 42-48, Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (No.
07-40416), 2007 WL 7131702 at *1, *9-18, *24-27, *35, *37-48; Brief for Appellee at 8-27, Castro
v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 07-40416), 2007 WL 7131703 at *8-15.
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The purpose of this article is not to suggest that the Fifth Circuit
was wrong in upholding the dismissal of Monica’s case. Indeed, the
court was faced with a dilemma that would give King Solomon pause:
what to do when two parents claim one child. This article’s purpose is
to show that a regulatory solution is preferable to forcing the courts to
make impossible choices between parents. Part II discusses the factual
and procedural history of Castro. Part III details the policies and rules
of law of immigration and custody at play in the case. Part IV explains
why the courts are not equipped to decide this issue satisfactorily, and
why a regulatory solution is needed. Part IV also discusses the proposed
regulation prohibiting the de facto deportation of a non-deportable child
with a deportable parent, with a stay of ninety days from the date of a
final decision to deport, unless the deportable parent obtains a custody
order. In those ninety days, the deportable parent should seek a custody
order. If there is no custody order at the end of the grace period, the
child will remain with the non-deportable parent.11 Part V reiterates the
need for a solution and concludes that the proposed regulation is the best
fit.
II. THE FACTS OF CASTRO V. UNITED STATES
The story of Monica Castro and Omar Gallardo is ultimately a story
of two parents claiming the same child—much like King Solomon was
forced to address. Monica, a United States citizen, moved into her
boyfriend Omar’s trailer in Lubbock, Texas, when she was sixteen.12
13
On December 4, 2002, at age
Omar was an undocumented alien.
seventeen, Monica gave birth to R.M.G.14 The couple had a stormy
relationship, and Monica claimed Omar was abusive, although she never
15
Monica did maintain, however,
informed her parents or the police.
that Omar was a good father to R.M.G. and never abused the baby.16

11. The child stays in the United States to avoid the de facto deportation of the child. There is
no reason to assume the non-deportable parent is more fit than the deportable parent.
12. Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 at *2. Monica originally moved from Corpus Christi
to Lubbock with her parents when she was fifteen. Id. She met Omar around that time. Id. Omar
lived near the trailer rented by her parents. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The baby was born a United States citizen. Id. Although the courts never give more
than the baby’s initials, it may be assumed her surname is “Gallardo”—Omar’s last name.
15. Id. at *3-4. Her reasons for not informing the police are unclear from the courts’
statements of fact. She may have been scared of Omar or the police. She may have invented the
story after the fact, or perhaps the abuse was so recent she never had a chance to go to any
authorities.
16. Id. at *4.
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After a particularly fierce argument, Monica went to stay with her
17
grandparents. She tried to get the baby back from Omar, but the local
law enforcement and child protection services did not intervene because
Monica and Omar were allegedly married by common law.18 Because
of the disputed marriage and Omar’s parentage of the child, Omar had
just as much right to the child as Monica, who was told to hire a private
attorney to seek a custody order.19 Fearing the attorney would take too
long, Monica and her aunt reported Omar as an undocumented alien two
20
days later.
When Monica reported Omar, Border Patrol Agent Manuel
Sanchez (“Sanchez”) spoke with Monica and told her Omar was wanted
as a possible witness to a homicide.21 Sanchez also told Monica to be
present when the Patrol apprehended Omar so she could be given the
22
Monica was scared of Omar, however, and only watched the
child.
arrest from her relatives’ trailer across the street.23 R.M.G. was taken
with Omar to the Border Patrol station where she was placed in a
holding cell with her father and some of his relatives, who were also
being deported.24 Monica arrived at the station shortly thereafter and
requested R.M.G. be left with her, and Sanchez called the local child
25
He was told protective services would not get
protective services.
involved unless the baby was abused, which was not the case for
R.M.G.26 The agents opted to reinstate an earlier deportation order
27
against Omar. They also opted to leave R.M.G. with Omar, rather than

17. Id. (her grandparents also lived in the Lubbock area).
18. Id. at *5. There is some dispute over their marriage because Monica was under eighteen;
the trial court did not decide the issue. Id. at *5 n.3.
19. Id. at *5. Omar also had a right to custody as the child’s father. Id. As the situation
stood, Monica and Omar had a civil dispute. Id.
20. Id. at *6. Although in hindsight Monica likely regretted the decision, it is hard to fault a
scared and possibly abused young woman for going to the authorities. Understanding the possible
legal outcomes of one’s actions is a standard lawyers are held to, not frightened teen mothers.
21. Id. at *7 n.4. The exact circumstances of the homicide are not given by the courts, but this
knowledge may have contributed to Monica’s fear of Omar.
22. Id. That is, without process the agents would have effectively granted Monica custody
based on the immigration status of the child.
23. Id. at *7. If she really was abused, then it is not hard to imagine why Monica was too
scared to confront Omar at the scene of the deportation she orchestrated. She may also have been
leery of Omar’s connection to the homicide, or unimpressed by the authorities’ lack of results thus
far in protecting her and her child.
24. Id. at *8. Monica later claimed she was also scared of Omar’s family. Id. at *7.
25. Id. at *8.
26. Id. at *8-9. Making this one of the rare and unfortunate cases where a child’s abuse
makes the parent’s position better.
27. Id. at *9.
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try to make a custody decision.28 The transport to Mexico was slated to
29
Monica frantically
leave at 3:15 that afternoon, with R.M.G. on it.
contacted an attorney at 1:30 to seek a temporary custody order.30 It did
not come in time, and R.M.G. was with her father when he was
31
deported.
In February 2006, Monica filed suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas against the United States seeking monetary,
declarative, and injunctive relief under the Fourth,32 Fifth,33 and
Fourteenth amendments,34 in addition to a number of claims under the
FTCA.35 Her injunction demanded the aid of the United States in
36
In September 2006, before the case was
finding her daughter.
resolved, Omar was detained on charges of illegal re-entry to the United
States.37 While in custody, Omar and Monica came to an agreement
returning the baby to her—three long years after R.M.G. was sent to
38
Mexico with Omar. After Monica amended her complaint to reflect
her daughter’s return, the United States moved to dismiss Monica’s
claims in November 2006 based on the discretionary function exception
of the FTCA.39 The District Court reasoned that the agents’ decision to
deport R.M.G. was discretionary and thus retentive of sovereign
immunity because “the Border Patrol Agents’ conduct in the situation
was not mandated by any statute, regulation or policy.”40 The District

28. Id. at *9-10. They also based their decision in part on Omar’s assertion that Monica had
“walked out on him.” Id. at *8.
29. Id. at *9. Had the agents decided not to reinstate the deportation order there would have
been considerably more time between Monica’s report to the Border Patrol and Omar’s deportation.
30. Id. at *9-10. The attorney drafted the necessary paperwork, but did not file it because she
wanted a judge’s signature on it first.
31. Id. at *10.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
35. Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 at *12. Those claims included negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Id. Pursuant to a motion to
dismiss, the District Court dismissed Monica’s constitutional claims for monetary relief as such
claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *11. R.M.G. was not with Omar at the time—she was living with his parents in
Mexico. Id.
38. Id. R.M.G. was returned on December 1, 2006. Id.
39. Id. at *12-13; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). The United States Supreme Court has said the
§ 2680(a) exception to tort liability applies where the challenged government action involves “an
element of judgment or choice” and the complained-of choice is “the kind that the discretionary
function exception was designed to shield.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991).
40. Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 at *22-23. The District Court also found the
decision involved an element of judgment or choice as required by Gaubert. Id. at *22.
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Court also noted R.M.G. was not technically deported, but rather left in
41
Finally, the court rejected
her father’s care when he was deported.
Monica’s claim that the Agents did not make an impermissible custody
determination, in part because leaving R.M.G. with Omar or removing
her from Omar’s care and leaving her with Monica would both be
custody decisions if Monica’s argument was persuasive.42
Monica appealed the dismissal, and a divided panel of the Fifth
43
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The panel majority
agreed with the District Court that no policies, rules, or statutes
governed the Agents’ conduct in this situation.44 The dissent likewise
45
concluded state and federal law were silent on the issue. For purposes
of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, the majority concluded
that violating the Constitution is never within the discretion of an
official, and doing so exceeds the scope of their authority.46 In
determining whether a party has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause
of action under this new doctrine, “a court must determine whether there
is a specific and intelligible constitutional mandate that involves or is
related to the alleged intentional torts of the accused officer(s).”47 The
majority then concluded Monica’s complaint met that standard, and
48
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of her case on the relevant issues.
41. Id. at *27 n.12. The term for what happened to baby R.M.G. is “de facto deportation.”
42. Id. at *28. This finding and the logic behind it are strained. If Monica was right, and the
Agents did make a custody determination, the same would indeed be true if they did the reverse.
But it makes little sense to then conclude that because both possible outcomes were impermissible,
one or both must be permissible. Once it is accepted, if only for the sake of argument, that an
impermissible custody decision was made, and the only alternative was another custody decision,
the correct conclusion is that the only outcome is an impermissible custody decision in favor of one
party or the other.
43. Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266
(5th Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 388 n.5.
45. Id. at 398 (Smith, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 390 (en banc). The Gaubert factors mentioned supra, in note 39, for determining
whether an act is shielded from tort liability make no mention of the scope of an agent’s authority.
The panel could be making the understandable policy judgment that the Constitution should not be
violated, agents do not have the choice of violating the Constitution, or the panel may have decided
that the choice to exceed one’s authority is not “the kind that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). The panel itself
admitted it and other courts were unclear on where to place this scope of authority analysis within
the Gaubert factors. Castro, 560 F.3d at 390.
47. Castro, 560 F.3d at 390. Once such a mandate exists, the court will then proceed to
analyze the merits of the state intentional tort claims. Id.
48. Id. at 392. Specifically, it found Monica alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss based on the discretionary function exception. Id. The majority recognized that the Border
Patrol agents were faced with a difficult choice, and narrowed its holding to situations in which the
Border Patrol knows the child is non-deportable. Id. at 391-92.
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The dissent meanwhile opined that the court “face[d] a situation as
old as the one faced by King Solomon, and one requiring his wisdom:
49
what to do when two parents claim a child.” In particular, the dissent
took the majority to task for the pleading standard announced, and
argued it would swallow the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA.50 That, in turn, would allow clever pleading to avoid sovereign
immunity by alleging a constitutional violation to avoid the discretionary
function exception, and a state cause of action overlapping the
constitutional claim.51
Monica did not win the day, however. An en banc rehearing by the
Fifth Circuit reversed the panel court and reinstated the District Court’s
decision to dismiss Monica’s complaint.52 The per curiam majority
deferred to the District Court in a terse opinion, stating, “[we] affirm [the
District Court], essentially for the reasons given by the district court . . .
”53 One dissenting judge, who had delivered the panel opinion,
disagreed with the majority and would have found the agents exceeded
54
their authority. Another dissenter agreed with the first, but proffered
another reason for waiving sovereign immunity.55 A third judge
dissented over the majority’s reading of sovereign immunity, but found
56
that only a handful of claims survived dismissal.
The dissents also disagreed over whether a de facto custody
decision was made by the agents. A custody decision would be outside
the authority of the Border Patrol agents.57 One dissenter implied there
was a de facto custody decision,58 while another found there was not.59
The majority did not address the issue.

49. Id. at 392 (Smith, J., dissenting). It is from this astute judgment that this article takes its
title.
50. Id. at 394.
51. Id. As the dissent puts it, “Voila! No more sovereign immunity.” Id.
52. Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
53. Id. at 268.
54. Id. at 274 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge Stewart offered essentially the same rational he
did in the panel case. Id.
55. Id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The additional reason proposed by Judge DeMoss is the
“law enforcement proviso” of § 2680(h), which waives sovereign immunity for enumerated
intentional torts and abuses of law enforcement powers. 28 U.S.C § 2680(h) (2006).
56. Castro, 608 F.3d at 269-71 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Dennis found the only actionable claims were those under the law enforcement proviso. Id. While
he agreed with the dissent that constitutional claims were outside the authority of officials, he found
the agents acted within their authority in this case. Id.
57. Johns v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 894 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981).
58. Castro, 608 F.3d at 274 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge Stewart noted the Border Patrol
lacks authority to make child custody decisions, but did not specifically inquire whether the Border
Patrol made such a determination in this case. Id.
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III. THE LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND SOCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
PROBLEM OF THE SINGLE DEPORTABLE PARENT
Child custody was at the heart of the Castro dispute, and its
workings will be important as the end product of any proposed solution
to the problem of the single deportable parent. Next, the workings of the
immigration system are primarily regulatory, and the powers and duties
of its agents are meticulously enumerated in Title 8 of the United States
60
Code Service and Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security oversee these
statutes and regulations. Although both the United States Code and the
Code of Federal Regulations are silent on the problem of the single
deportable parent, that silence both speaks to the intent of the rulemakers and needs to be filled. Further, the single deportable parent
problem necessarily involves an intersection between family law and
immigration law.61 Despite intersecting frequently, the two bodies of
62
The
law draw on conflicting sources and follow conflicting values.
proposed solution must account for the background that created it.
A.

The Workings of Child Custody

At the broadest level, child custody “refers to the relationship
which exists between parents and child in a normal intact family.”63
This encompasses living with the child, and the rights and obligations to
supervise, care for, and educate the child.64 When the family is split up
for whatever reason, all the rights and obligations formerly shared in the
65
family unit have to be broken up and distributed by the court. Some
statutes distinguish these rights by calling the right to live with the child

59. Id. at 270 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Dennis found there
was no custody determination because the agents elected to respect Omar’s decision to keep the
baby with him, rather than take the baby from someone who had a legitimate claim to custody. Id.
After the en banc rehearing, certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed. It was denied
in Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 902 (2011).
60. 8 U.S.C. (2012);8 C.F.R. (2012).
61. See infra Part III.D.
62. Family law is state law, while immigration law is federal regulatory law. Family law
values things like the best interests of the child, while immigration law values the efficiency of its
regulatory scheme.
63. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
20.2 (2d ed. 1987).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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“physical custody” and the right to make decisions about the child’s care
66
“legal custody.”
Related to physical and legal custody is joint custody (which can be
broken up into joint legal custody67 and joint physical custody),68 which
generally preserves custody rights in both parents even though they are
69
In the case of joint legal custody, each parent has equal
separated.
decision-making power over things like health care, religion, and
70
education. In the event of a disagreement, the parents can go to a court
to “break the tie.”71 When deciding whether to award joint custody,
some courts consider factors like the couple’s geographic proximity.72
In cases where the parents live some distance from each other, the courts
73
must necessarily award sole physical custody to one parent. There is a
general consensus amongst courts that joint custody will not be awarded
74
where the parents are antagonistic to each other. Proponents of joint
custody maintain that it allows the child to feel loved by both parents,
and provides a sense of emotional stability.75 There is also some
scholarly concern over the effect this “judicial parenting” has on the
76
family.

66. Id. In the facts of Castro, Omar received both physical custody (the child lived with him
in Mexico) and legal custody (he had the right to make choices about the child’s care).
67. CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5; see also Randall H. Warner, Parenting from the Bench, 46
AUG ARIZ. ATT’Y 24, 26 (2010).
68. CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5; see also Susan A. Dwyer, How to Share Parenting, 33SUM FAM. ADVOC. 4 (2010) (joint physical custody generally means the child spends time living
with each parent).
69. CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5; Warner, supra note 67, at 26. When a writer refers to “joint
custody” without denoting it is joint legal custody or joint physical custody, the writer is generally
referring to joint legal custody. See CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5 (courts, commentators, and statute
drafters are not always clear in their use of these terms, however).
70. Warner, supra note 67, at 26; CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5.
71. Warner, supra note 67, at 26.
72. CLARK, supra note 63, §20.5.
73. Id.
74. Id. (noting that courts take this approach because joint custody ideally involves
cooperation amongst the parents).
75. Id.
76. Warner, supra note 67, at 26; see also Julie Hixson-Lambson, Consigning Women to the
Immediate Orbit of a Man: How Missouri’s Relocation Law Substitutes Judicial Paternalism for
Parental Judgment by Forcing Parents to Live Near One Another, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1365, 1370
(2010) (suggesting joint physical custody impairs the parents’ ability to live where they want);
Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological Perspective on Shared Custody
Arrangements, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 426-31 (2008) (pointing out there are issues with the
psychological and economic well-being of the child in joint custody arrangements). However, some
states feel that joint custody is better for the child, and create a presumption in its favor. CLARK,
supra note 63, §20.5; see also Noel Semple, Whose Best Interests? Custody and Access Law and
Procedure, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 287, 299 (2010).
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The Immigration System, Mixed Status Families, and Disparate
Treatment

The immigration system treats mixed status families, that is, those
77
differently.
The
containing multiple immigration statuses,
immigration system’s treatment of a mixed status family is plainly unfair
because it can break up the family.
1. The Workings of the Immigration System
The immigration system functions like a machine—well-oiled, but
blind to the human consequences of its actions. Just as importantly, it
assigns a status to each immigrant, thereby creating the “illegal
immigrant” class.78 The immigration system is vast, but it does not
cover all possible contingencies. Many critiques are leveled at it,79 but
the immigration system is not easily assailable for failing to account for
a possibility such as the problem of the single deportable parent.
The typical deportation proceeding begins with a choice to pursue
deportation. Once the immigration authorities decide to pursue
deportation, and there is reason to suspect the alien is deportable, the
potential deportee is given written notice80 to appear in the removal
proceeding held before an immigration judge.81 The alien has the
82
privilege of being represented, but not on the government dollar. The
burden is on the alien to prove legal presence in the United States by

77. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
78. Immigration law “not only define[s] who is a legal immigrant but also, by necessity,
create[s] the converse – the ‘illegal’ or undocumented [immigrant].” Lenni B. Benson, The
Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 483, 484 (2002).
79. To be fair, critiques of the immigration system are too varied to generalize. For a critique
of Border Patrol violence against undocumented immigrants, see Jesus A. Trevino, Border Violence
Against Illegal Immigrants and the Need to Change the Border Patrol’s Current Complaint Review
Process, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 85 (1998). For a critique of the immigration system’s treatment of
family separation, see S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85 (2007). For a critique of the “crazy
conglomeration” of provisions defining what a child is for purposes of immigration, see David B.
Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal Family Law in the
Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 506-07 (2008).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012). Such notice must contain certain information, including the
nature of the charges. Id.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (a)(1) (2012). The judge may consider evidence, examine witnesses,
issue subpoenas, and issue sanctions, among other things. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(1). In lieu of
deportation proceedings, the alien may elect to leave voluntarily. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(A). The alien does not have the right to representation. The alien
has other privileges, including presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a (b)(4)(B).
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clear and convincing evidence.83 If the alien has been admitted to the
United States, the burden is on the immigration authorities to prove the
84
alien is deportable by clear and convincing evidence. The alien may
apply for relief from removal, in which case the burden is on the alien to
85
prove eligibility and that the alien’s case merits discretionary relief. If
the immigration judge decides the alien is deportable, and elects
deportation, the alien is given notice of the right to appeal.86 Once an
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General will remove the alien,
87
generally within 90 days.
The immigration laws and regulations, particularly those granting
relief for undue hardship, also take into account the potential deportee’s
family status, such as for the hardship to one’s self or citizen spouse or
child.88 The policy for making exceptions is to grant some relief from
89
the otherwise harsh mechanical application of the immigration laws.
Although efficiency is an important value of the immigration scheme, it
seems there is some compassion in its tin man’s heart.
2. The Mixed Status Family and Its Different Treatment by the
Immigration System
When a family is mixed status,90 the harshness of the immigration
laws applies unevenly to each family member.91 In the instance of a
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(2)(B). Although it resembles a criminal trial, deportation is a civil
proceeding.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(3)(A). This statute and others use the terms “remove” and
“removable” instead of “deport” and “deportable.” Id.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(4). The judge also has to weigh the credibility of witnesses. The
immigration judge’s discretion extends to considering “the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors” when weighing witness credibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(4)(C). In determining
whether the alien has met their burden, the judge has wide discretion, limited to weighing credible
evidence and testimony of the record. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(4)(B).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(5). The alien may also file one motion to reconsider within thirty
days of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(6).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(1)(A) (2012). The period begins from the final deportation order, the
date of a court’s final order in the event of judicial review, or if the alien has been detained, the date
of release from detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(1)(B). This ninety-day period is why the grace
period in the proposal lasts ninety days.
88. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.65 (2010) (eligibility for suspension of deportation); 8 C.F.R. §
1240.58(a) (2010) (suspension of deportation requires, inter alia, a showing of extreme hardship to
self or citizen spouse or child); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.64(d) (rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship
for certain classes of aliens).
89. See Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005).
90. A mixed status family is one whose members have different immigration statuses, and the
numbers are on the rise. David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45,
49-50 (2005). Thronson suggests the increase in mixed status families leads to an increasing focus
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whole family subject to deportation, the consequences are natural and
uniform, if no less harsh: the entire family is uprooted and returned to
92
In the case of the mixed status family, any
their country of origin.
application of immigration law is likely to split up the family.93
The mixed status family is not simply the result of an influx of
94
95
undocumented immigrants with the desire to get married. The mixed
status family is the child of tightening legalization and naturalization

on immigration status in family courts. Id. Interestingly, homes headed by immigrants are more
likely to have children, and are more likely to retain both parents. Id. The operation of immigration
law to the mixed status family may thus produce any number of disparate results; in the case of the
single deportable parent, the parents can be separated from each other in much the same way as the
child may be separated from a parent. Of families that are mixed-status, forty-one percent have
parents with different immigration statuses, which is the scenario that gives rise to the problem of
the single deportable parent. See Valerie Leiter et al., Challenges to Children's Independent
Citizenship: Immigration, Family, and the State, 13 CHILDHOOD 11, 17 (2006).
91. Despite the importance of family in immigration law, “immigrant families are not viewed
as a unit, and individual family members are not equal.” David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids?
Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
979, 993 (2002).
92. Admittedly, there are still serious concerns for whole families subject to deportation. If
they have mortgaged a home, what do they do about the payments that need to be made? See
Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker
Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 587 (2010). What if the wage-earner has learned a
specific skill that will be wasted if forced to seek a job outside the state? Id. How will the family
be provided for when deported? Id. How can one support the family in the long term if the threat
of being deported looms large? Id.
93. See infra note 112 and the accompanying text. The nature of the mixed status family is to
have immigration law require something different for different family members, which may well
include deporting an undocumented father while allowing a citizen mother to remain, or any number
of other combinations.
94. Mexico continues to be synonymous with immigration regulation and its relative
successes and failures. Interestingly, the number of deportable aliens located (not to be confused
with the number of aliens deported) in 2009 was 613,003, the lowest number since 1972.
Immigration Yearbook at 91. 528,139 were from Mexico. Id. at 92.
95. Some undocumented immigrants mistakenly believe marrying a United States citizen will
remedy their undocumented status. Julie Mercer, The Marriage Myth: Why Mixed-Status
Marriages Need an Immigration Remedy, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293 (2008). The
immigration system greatly burdens mixed status families by forcing spouses to weigh the risks and
benefits of leaving the country to attempt compliance with the law and seek reentry, or stay and risk
being discovered. Id. at 294-95. The current state of immigration law can encourage the separation
of spouses by barring legal reentry for three to ten years for those attempting to correct their
immigration status. Id. at 295. Further, this mistaken belief shows one way the mixed status family
will grow in the coming years. Similarly, any person who is barred from adjusting their
immigration status can only petition for a legal permanent resident status from outside the United
States. See Thronson, supra note 90, at 51. However, there is a second provision that prevents the
reentry for three years of an alien that had been in the country unlawfully for 180 days and
voluntarily departed. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2006). The cumulative effect of these denial of
reentry provisions may be a perverse incentive to remain in the United States illegally and hope for
a means of legitimizing one’s status. Benson, supra note 78, at 488.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/7

12

Yahner: Splitting the Baby

13- YAHNER_MACRO.DOCM

2012]

7/12/2012 3:41 PM

SPLITTING THE BABY

781

requirements.96 Because of the lack of prospects for legitimization and
97
limited enforcement of immigration regulations beyond border areas,
the “shadow population” of undocumented immigrants continues to
grow.98 As the population of undocumented immigrants grows,99
contact with legal residents is certain to grow, along with the number of
100
And where there are mixed status families,
mixed status families.
there is the problem of the single deportable parent.101
C.

Immigration Statutes and Regulations: What They Empower the
Border Patrol to Do

The immigration framework set out in Title 8 of the United States
Code and Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations is so extensive it
seems to leave no contingency unplanned for.102
Though

96. Thronson, supra note 90, at 49-52 (tracing the rise in mixed status families to policies of
declaring more aliens illegal, generating barriers to legitimization, and lack of interest in deporting
after arrival); BRYAN C. BAKER, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., NATURALIZATION RATES AMONG
IRCA
IMMIGRANTS:
A
2009
UPDATE
(2010),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/irca-natz-fs-2009.pdf (last visited May 2,
2012) (reflecting much lower rates of naturalization for Mexican immigrants in two major
categories of potential candidates for lawful permanent residency; other countries of origin have
much higher success rates). See also Thronson, supra note 79, at 454 (“As the number of
immigrants and children of immigrants in the United States grows, it is increasingly common to find
mixed-status families in which all family members do not share a single immigration or citizenship
status.”) (internal citations omitted).
97. See Thronson, supra note 90, at 49-50.
98. See id. at 51-53. As of 2005, estimates of the size of the undocumented population range
from seven million to eleven million. Id. at 50. Further, households headed by immigrants are
more likely to have children. MICHAEL F. FIX, WENDY ZIMMERMAN & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE
URBAN INST., THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2001),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_integration.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)
(fifty-five percent of immigrant families have children, compared to thirty-five percent of
nonimmigrant families).
99. “The illegal alien of today may well be the illegal alien of tomorrow.” Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 207 (1982) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Thronson, supra
note 90, at 52 (the United States has “increasingly become home to a long-term undocumented
population [and] it is not surprising that members of this population marry and have children,
creating mixed-status immigrant households” and “[t]he formation of family ties between
undocumented immigrants and persons with legal immigration status in turn influences the
decisions of undocumented immigrants to remain in this country.”) Of families headed by a
noncitizen with children, eighty-five percent are mixed-status families. FIX, ZIMMERMAN &
PASSEL, supra note 98, at 15.
100. See supra notes 90, 95, and 96.
101. Further, as “immigrants and immigrant families arrive at family courts, voluntarily or not,
they bring immigration related issues with them.” See Thronson, supra note 90, at 50.
102. “The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men Gang aft agley”. Robert Burns, To a Mouse, in
KILMARNOCK VOLUME (1785). In standard English, the line reads, “the best laid schemes of mice
and men Often go awry.”
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comprehensive, the immigration scheme is not foolproof.103 Its gaps are
simply smaller and less noticeable than most.
The most crucial definition is the term “alien,” which 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) defines as “any person not a citizen or national of the United
104
The Border Patrol is given significant power relating to the
States.”
detention and eventual deportation of aliens,105 but has power over
United States citizens in only two enumerated situations: when crimes
are committed in the agent’s presence, and when they have a reasonable
belief a felony occurred.106 There is no statutory or regulatory authority
concerning the single deportable parent.107
An expressio unius analysis of the statute’s definition of “alien”
flows thusly: Congress said “alien,” which cannot be a United States
citizen.108 Aliens may be deported, while citizens and American
109
nationals are not mentioned in any statute authorizing deportation.
Congress knew how to give power to the agents over United States
citizens, and did so only in limited cases. Nowhere does any statute
even mention deporting United States citizens,110 implying Congress
had no intent to allow it.

103. See supra note 101; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text. Further, the increase
in border security means that border crossings have become increasingly dangerous. See Thronson,
supra note 90, at 51.
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).
105. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996)
(explaining the broad discretion Immigration and Naturalization Services, the predecessor of the
Department of Homeland Security, has “in determining who, among a class of eligible aliens, may
be granted relief” from removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a)(1) (2006) (the Secretary is “charged with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to immigration and
naturalization of aliens . . . .”); 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006) (power granted over “[a]pprehension and
detention of aliens”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) (power granted over “[d]eportable aliens”); and 8
U.S.C. § 1231 (power granted over “[d]etention and removal of aliens ordered removed.”).
106. The only authority granted to the Patrol over United States citizens is in 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(a)(5) (2006). The border patrol agents may make arrests if a crime is committed in their presence
or they have a reasonable belief a felony occurred, regardless of the immigration status of the
perpetrator. Id.
107. The District Court explicitly noted this in Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *26 n.11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d
en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
109. Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 at *26 n.11.
110. Part of the problem here is that the child in the single deportable parent problem is not
actually deported, but rather is left in the custody of the parent being deported. This reading of the
statutes and regulations thus produces the general conclusion that deportation or its analogues were
disfavored by the drafters. It does not, however, create any express prohibition of the de facto
deportation of a United States citizen child.
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Case law and official reports confirm this reading of the statutes
111
The Ninth Circuit has already spoken on this issue,
and regulations.
and concluded the immigration authorities lack the power to deport
United States citizens.112 In 2009, the Inspector General released a
report entitled “Removals Involving Parents of United States Citizen
113
It states that known United States citizens apprehended
Children.”
alongside undocumented aliens are not placed in immigration
114
Instead, if Immigration and Customs Enforcement
detention.
determines a child is a United States citizen, that child will be released to
the parent’s designated custodian or Child Protective Services.115 In
reviewing more than 180,000 instances of removal of alien parents with
116
citizen children between the years 1998 and 2007, the Office of the
Inspector General told Congress “there were no instances of detaining
United States citizen children and that Immigration and Customs
Enforcement would not knowingly hold a United States citizen child in
detention.”117 Thus, the immigration system itself has expressed a
policy of not deporting or detaining United States citizens.
D.

The Peculiar and Conflicted Mix at the Intersection of Immigration
and Family Law

Immigration and family law are two different fields of law built on
entirely different foundations. There are, however, areas of significant
overlap and conflict,118 including situations in which one body of law
usurps the function of the other.119 Although this intersection is rarely
120
addressed in scholarly works, the treatment of immigration issues in
family court and the treatment of family law issues in immigration court
have significant implications for the problem of the single deportable

111. See infra notes 112 and 113.
112. See Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 710-12 (9th Cir. 2008) (“There is no dispute
that if Torres is a citizen the government has no authority under the [Immigration and Nationality
Act] to detain him, as well as no interest in doing so, and that his detention would be unlawful under
the Constitution . . . .”)
113. OIG Report, supra note 9.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 5. This period includes the detention and removal of R.M.G. in December 2003.
Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *8. How Monica Castro’s case was omitted is unknown.
117. OIG Report, supra note 9, at 11.
118. Thronson, supra note 90, at 47-48 (arguing these areas merit far more attention than they
receive in scholarly circles).
119. See infra notes 148, 150-51.
120. Thronson, supra note 90, at 47-48.
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parent and any proposed solution. There are also constitutional issues at
121
play, particularly the rights of parents to raise their child.
1. Immigration in Family Law and Family Law in Immigration
Law
Immigration law is predominantly federal,122 while family law is
123
Indeed, federal authority over immigration
the province of the states.
is almost absolute, and few areas of state authority are more sacrosanct
than family law.124 However, one author has declared there is a
“massive oversimplification in the traditional notion that family law is
the exclusive province of the states while immigration law is entirely
federal.”125 Moreover, the two bodies of law revolve around two highly
126
Immigration law
different standards, and emphasize different values.
relies on a carefully enumerated clockwork system of regulations, while
family law typically centers on the amorphous “best interests” standard
when child custody is an issue.127 Thus, their sources are different, their
analysis is different, and what they value is different.128
121. See infra notes 140-45.
122. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (“For reasons long recognized as
valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.” (quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976))); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“[O]ver no
conceivable subject [than immigration] is the legislative power more complete.”) (quoting Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); see also Mathews, 426 U.S. at 7980 (In exercising its considerable immigration power “Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”)
123. See, e.g., Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to
the laws of the United States.”); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (“We
conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to
issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”); see also Ferguson, supra note 79, at 89 (noting
federalism concerns arise whenever immigration and family law meet).
124. Infra notes 144 and 145.
125. See Thronson, supra note 79, at 508.
126. Specifically, those values are the child’s best interests for family law and efficiency for
the immigration system. Thronson, supra note 79, at 506 (the immigration system is
“fundamentally at odds with the child-centered values of family law”). Professor Thronson argues
the immigration system is so complex it has become difficult to administer, and it creates
“meaningless traps for the unwary and misinformed.” Id. at 506-07. He further argues the
immigration system’s “inconsistent requirements create an uneven playing field that lacks reasoned
justification for its disparate treatment of children and families.” Id. at 507.
127. Almost all “nations are guided by the precept that the primary consideration underlying
any [child] custody decision must be the best interests of the child.” D. Marianne Blair & Merle H.
Weiner, Resolving Parental Custody Disputes—A Comparative Exploration, 39 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247
(2005). Every state in the United States uses the best interests standard. Id. See also Thronson,
supra note 79, at 506-13 (analyzing and critiquing the conflicting values of best interests and
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Due primarily to federalism concerns,129 there is a tendency to
130
However, the
attempt separation of immigration and family law.
reality is that such attempts are only partially successful at best.131
Realistically, the two bodies of law each have something to say about
the mixed status family, whether it is when immigration officials say
R.M.G. has to stay with Omar, or if a family court were to award
custody based solely on the immigration status of the parents.132
Certainly, whenever the problem of the single deportable parent rears its
ugly head, family law and immigration law will meet.
As was the case with Monica, Omar, and their daughter,
immigration law can effectively make custody decisions supposedly
reserved for family courts.133 Such de facto custody determinations
violate the principle of federalism by having a federal authority like the
134
Border Patrol make decisions denied it but granted to the States.
Conversely, family law also can make decisions ostensibly reserved
for immigration courts.135 Family law courts are apparently all too eager
to consider the parents’ immigration status in making custody
136
The family courts reflect the same anti-immigration
decisions.
attitude reflected in the regulations137 and popular opinion.138
regulatory efficiency in the context of child custody, particularly how immigration law functions as
federal family law). Also of note in the same article is the suggestion that Congress may use its
power over immigration to impermissibly legislate in the area of family law, for example, by
defining family to exclude a child born out of wedlock. Id. at 510.
128. See infra notes 148 and 149 and accompanying text.
129. Congress is not given Constitutional authority over family law matters, and may not
encroach on the states’ domain in this area, while the states will be preempted in the event of
conflicting laws by implication of the Supremacy Clause contained in U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
130. The Fifth Circuit, which decided the Castro case, has itself held the border patrol has no
authority to make custody decisions in Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 894 n.26 (5th
Cir. 1981); see also supra note 28.
131. See Thronson, supra note 79, at 508.
132. Professor Thronson notes that whenever immigration law functions as family law, it is
often “[w]ithout analysis or rationale.” Id. at 454. The solution proposed in this article aims to
prevent one such instance of unguided de facto family law decisions.
133. For example, one author suggests immigration law can function as family law in the
regulation of marriage. See generally Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005). Professor Thronson argues
the immigration system functions as family law when it determines where and with whom children
live. Thronson, supra note 79, at 508.
134. See infra notes 144 and 145.
135. See Thronson, supra note 90, at 47 (providing a striking example of a family court
expressly basing its decision on the immigration status of the mother).
136. Id. Professor Thronson divides the approaches to immigration that family courts take into
four categories: discrimination (the “I Have a Problem With Your Immigration Situation”
approach), manipulation (the use of family law’s flexible equitable powers to achieve immigration
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2. Constitutional Issues in Child Custody for Immigrants
Parents and children faced with the problem of the single
deportable parent may argue that the de facto deportation of their child is
unconstitutional.139 De facto deportation occurs where a United States
citizen child remains with their parent when that parent is deported.
Further, when de facto deportation acts to interfere with families, such
interference could be unconstitutional under doctrines protecting the
family from government intrusion.
Few rights are more cherished in constitutional tradition than the
right of a parent to raise his or her biological child, and the broad
protection of the family, regardless of its form.140 Such rights are “more

outcomes), obfuscation (masking the real impact immigration status has on the outcome of the
proceeding), and accommodation (where the court does not attempt to shape a party’s immigration
status, but rather responds to the consequences of the status). Id. at 53-71. Discrimination based on
immigration status stems from perceiving “illegality” as a license to discriminate. Id. at 54.
Professor Thronson notes this behavior is best addressed through Due Process and Equal Protection.
Id. at 57-58. Manipulation often involves a request from the undocumented party to consider
immigration status. Id. at 60. Although manipulation is frequently done with good intentions,
Professor Thronson warns that it will frequently have unintended negative consequences. Id. at 6064. Obfuscation, meanwhile, involves stating a standard such as the best interests of the child as a
shield to considering immigration concerns both legitimate and illegitimate. Id. at 64-68. Finally,
accommodation is the broadest and most common category of family court approaches to
immigration law. Id. at 68. In accommodation cases, the court simply acknowledges the
consequences for immigration status without basing its decision on such concerns. Id. Regardless
of which approach is taken, the immigration status of a party sometimes determines the outcome of
a family case. Id. at 72.
137. See supra note 78 and accompanying text, detailing how the immigration system creates a
class of undocumented aliens.
138. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
139. Professor Thronson recognizes that the immigration system’s treatment of families and
children has constitutional dimensions. See Thronson, supra note 101, at 510 (mentioned in a
discussion of the Castro district court opinion).
140. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that parents have a
constitutionally protected interest in allowing their children to learn German); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in
choosing for their children to attend private parochial schools); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a grandmother has a constitutionally protected interest in living with
grandchildren who are each other’s first cousin); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding
that individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in being able to marry, and finding
unconstitutional a statute preventing marriage for those behind on child support payments); Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in
limiting the visitation rights to their children for a deceased spouse’s grandparents); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding the burden of proof for the state to remove children from the
parent’s custody cannot constitutionally be less than clear and convincing evidence); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971) (holding that a law automatically divesting an unwed father’s custody
rights in his children upon the death of the mother is constitutionally repugnant).
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precious than property rights.”141 Even in the rare cases where the
government may intrude upon the family, it must still comply with
142
Immigrants, even those here illegally, are
procedural due process.
guaranteed certain fundamental liberties by the Constitution,143 such as
144
For Equal Protection
rights to raise children and have families.
purposes, the states have considerably less judicial deference when it
comes to classifying people based on alienage.145
Each time United States citizen children are effectively deported,
146
Each
the parent’s constitutional right to raise the child is implicated.
141. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (internal citation omitted).
142. See id. (requiring both notice and the opportunity to be heard before the government may
abridge the parent’s liberty to raise their child, and that notice must be done in a time and manner
that is actually effective for informing the parent how to challenge); see also Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time in a
meaningful manner”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (the process that is due depends on the
nature of the deprivation); and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (individual interest in
additional procedures is weighed alongside the value of prevention and the government’s interest in
speedy, efficient procedures).
143. The Supreme Court has interpreted Due Process and Equal Protection to include a variety
of rights for aliens. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886):
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens
. . . [due process and equal protection] are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is the pledge of the protection of equal
laws.
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (holding the Fourth
Amendment forbids the stopping and searching a car on less than a reasonable suspicion its
occupants might be immigrants); City of Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(general rule of deference to legislature gives way when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or
national origin; these classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, in part because these factors are
“so seldom relevant” to any legitimate state interest, and reflect prejudice that the burdened class is
unworthy of protection); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1903) (holding the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings); and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990) (listing
constitutional rights aliens enjoy).
144. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-17 (1982) (holding undocumented immigrant
children are entitled to equal protection and due process). The rights listed in supra note 165 all
arise from interpretations of those two constitutional guarantees.
145. In general, “state anti-immigration discrimination . . . has been subject to strict scrutiny
(and therefore invalidated), but . . . identical federal discrimination has been subject only to rational
basis review (and therefore upheld).” Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of
Immigration Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 496 (2001). See
also supra note 165. However, noncitizens “as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and
insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938)). See also Thronson, supra note 90, at 57-60 (discussing the Due Process and
Equal Protection rights of aliens despite the limits of those rights when compared to the
considerable power of Congress over immigration).
146. See supra note 145.
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time these citizen children are detained, their right to be free from
147
Each time the mixed
unreasonable search and seizure is implicated.
status families of the United States are separated, their constitutional
rights are implicated.148 Each time the children are effectively deported
149
and their families split up, their right to a hearing is implicated.
There is one further wrinkle in the constitutional aspect of the
single deportable parent problem. There is authority from the federal
appellate courts that de facto deportation is constitutional where both
parents are deportable, or where the only parent is deportable.150 The
courts have given two reasons for this outcome. First, the child is not
151
Second, a
barred from returning—residence is only postponed.
finding that de facto deportation is unconstitutional would create an
exception that would swallow the rule—any immigrant could have a
child in the United States and become effectively immune from
deportation.152
These cases are, however, distinguishable from the problem of the
single deportable parent. This jurisprudence all arose from the context
of both parents being deported.153 As its name implies, the problem of
the single deportable parent necessarily involves one parent remaining in
the United States. Further, part of the issue is that the family is broken
up by the government’s action, rather than being kept together by being
deported as a unit.154 The rationale sustaining this jurisprudence also
155
An
does not hold true as applied to the single deportable parent.
exception against de facto deportation in the context of a single
deportable parent would not allow the deportable parent to escape
deportation—it could only allow the otherwise non-deportable child to
remain. Further, although the child is not permanently deprived of the

147. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
148. See supra note 145, and infra notes 164 and 165.
149. See supra note 42.
150. See, e.g., Urbano de Malaluan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 577 F.2d 589, 594
(9th Cir. 1978); Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1986); Newton v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 736 F.2d 336, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1981); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558
F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977); Mendez v. Major, 340 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965); Schleiffer v.
Meyers, 644 F.2d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 1981); and Gonzales-Cuevas v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975).
151. See Schleiffer, 644 F.2d at 663.
152. See Urbano de Malaluan, 577 F.2d at 594.
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
154. This makes the situation analogous to cases like Stanley v. Illinois, where the
government’s actions broke up the family. 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
155. See infra notes 173 and 174 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to re-enter the United States, realistically they are still
deprived of the right to live with one of their parents.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE SINGLE DEPORTABLE PARENT AND ITS
SOLUTION
The need for a solution to the problem of the single deportable
parent stems from multiple sources. First, the courts are simply not
equipped to offer a satisfactory resolution. Second, there are practical
and humanitarian reasons for resolving the issue—for both the mixed
status family and the immigration system itself. The ultimate proposed
solution in this paper, to provide a ninety-day grace period to seek a
custody determination, attempts to account for the myriad factors that
must inform its ultimate shape.
A.

Problems Inherent in Leaving the Issue to the Courts

Although courts will invariably do their best, the judicial system
lacks certain key tools needed for an effective solution.156 The courts
function well when presented with wrongs to redress and violations of
157
However, their ability to prevent future problems is
individual rights.
limited to addressing future wrongs of the same genus in whatever case
158
While this is fine in
happens to be immediately before the court.
many cases, the problem of the single deportable parent demands to be
prevented, not redressed after the fact.
Monica Castro’s situation is illustrative of this point. In Monica’s
case, she was fortunate to reclaim her daughter after only three years.159
When she first filed her claim, by far the most meaningful relief she
sought was an injunction ordering the United States to help find her

156. The most important of these tools is the ability to fashion prospective solutions.
157. On the duties owed by a public official directed by law to perform a given task, Chief
Justice Marshall said, “[b]ut where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend
upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 166 (1803). Marshall says, in other words, that an individual wronged on an individual level
by a nondiscretionary government action may seek redress in the courts.
158. That great strength of the courts noted in supra note 157 is also their great limitation.
Courts lack jurisdiction to address issues relating to broader social ills—political questions.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.
159. Her good fortune in being torn from her daughter for a mere three years was no doubt lost
on Monica Castro.
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daughter.160 Monica was limited to declaratory and monetary relief
161
The awkward inadequacy of the
once her daughter was returned.
remedial measures demonstrates the need for a preventative solution.
The courts’ involvement in the problem of the single deportable
parent does nothing to resolve the problem that any custody decision by
federal agents violates the principle of federalism.162 To say that doing
nothing is not making a custody decision is to ignore that the practical
effect is the same as deciding the child must go with the deportable
parent.163 Because the current state of the immigration regulations
forces the Border Patrol to make impermissible de facto and de jure
custody decisions, the courts’ only redress is to resort to legal fiction
declaring no custody decision has been made.164
Any Circuit could address the problem of the single deportable
parent differently from the Fifth Circuit. The differences of opinion
between the judges of the Fifth Circuit demonstrate there is an array of
possible outcomes.165 Unless the Supreme Court decides the issue,
inconsistency will be the inevitable result. Inconsistency raises
numerous problems for a federal agency like the Department of
Homeland Security.166 Inconsistent judgments from courts mean
inconsistent obligations for the Border Patrol based on what region it is
167
Uniformity is one of the reasons immigration is left in
operating in.
federal hands, and one of the reasons why the solution should originate
168
from the Department of Homeland Security.

160. See Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *9-10 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 9, 2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir.
2010).
161. Id. at *12.
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163. In speaking of the Castro dispute, Professor Thronson states that “plainly, the operation of
immigration effectively functioned to determine the custody of the child for the next three years.”
Thronson, supra note 79, at 510. He also states that child custody “was effectively determined
without process and without any consideration of the interests of the child.” Id.
164. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
165. See Castro, 560 F.3d 381; Castro, 608 F.3d 266.
166. Avoiding inconsistency is one of the primary purposes of a singular immigration
authority. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
167. For example, the de facto deportation of a child in the single deportable scenario may
raise no issues if taken in Texas, but could be deemed unconstitutional in California.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress shall have the power to “establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization. . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state where they reside. . . .”); and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 5 (“Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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The Need for a Solution

A resolution to the problem of the single deportable parent is
needed for a plethora of reasons. The problem produces unfair results
for some members of mixed status families without any offsetting
benefit. However, protecting parents and children from unwarranted
harm is not the only reason to adopt a solution to the single deportable
parent issue. The Department of Homeland Security and the Border
Patrol also stand to benefit from guidance in future cases, preventing
federalism problems inherent in having federal agents make de facto
custody decisions, and avoiding litigation.
1. Uneven Application and Inequitable Results
It is too harsh to impose both deportation and a de facto custody
determination in the problem of the single deportable parent. The
current immigration system has inconsistent consequences for mixed
status families, with scant reasons for those inconsistencies. In Castro,
Omar received an unexpected benefit from his own deportation—he was
effectively given custody of his child without ever seeking the benefit of
a family court determination. The harsh results on affected families
weigh in favor of adopting a solution to the problem of the single
deportable parent. Monica Castro spent three years searching for her
daughter when she was sent to Mexico with her father.169 Others may
be lucky to see their children again within a lifetime, much less actually
obtain custody. Meanwhile, without a custody decision, there is no
assurance the child’s best interests are met. While Omar was not
abusive to his daughter, future deported parents could be. Such parents
could get the effects of a custody decision they never would have earned
had there been an actual custody proceeding.
Those in R.M.G.’s position are American children—although it
makes sense that they can be deportable-in-fact in very limited cases to
keep families together,170 breaking families up based on the immigration
status of the parents is unsupportable.171 Regardless of whether any
family member has broken the law, due process requires the State to

169. Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
9, 2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
170. The panel dissent recognized the importance of keeping a family together when both
parents are deportable but the child is not. Castro, 560 F.3d at 396 (Smith, J., dissenting).
171. See infra note 201. Because alienage may be a suspect classification according to City of
Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Center, it may well be that breaking up families because of their alienage
violates equal protection, or is at least subject to strict scrutiny. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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meet a heavy burden before it may separate a family.172 The essence of
substantive due process is that the State cannot invade certain protected
areas without justification. This is a case where there is no sufficient
justification for interfering with existing parental relationships. Because
this is a situation where action and inaction have the same disruptive
results, an affirmative solution is needed to avoid violations of due
process and equal protection.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, when the law categorizes
individuals by their immigration status, the lack of fault on the part of a
minor child is constitutionally significant for purposes of equal
protection.173 The immigration system may be harsh, but it reserves its
ire for those who break the law. For the most part it succeeds.
However, not only was R.M.G. an innocent child, but also a United
States citizen. She had done nothing to deserve de facto deportation.174
2. Practical Concerns
There are a number of practical concerns for the Department of
Homeland Security that weigh in favor of amending the immigration
regulations to account for the single deportable parent issue. The source
for many of these concerns is the probability of the recurring single
deportable parent issue. Each time the scenario occurs, the Department
will again have to face constitutional challenges and negative publicity.
Worse still, it risks treading into the states’ family law dominion, where
175
federal agencies are unwelcomed intruders.
The problem of the single deportable parent is not limited to the
unusual facts in Castro. It looms large over every mixed status family,
whether or not the couple is married.176 Because of the growth of the
177
mixed status family, the problem is bound to happen again.
172. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982) (to satisfy Due Process, where the state
attempts to extinguish parents’ custody rights, the burden of proof the state must bear of showing
abuse cannot be less than clear and convincing).
173. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). In Plyler, the Court struck down on equal
protection grounds a Texas law refusing funding to school districts that did not spend money on
education for legal resident children. Id. at 230. At the same time, undocumented aliens are not a
suspect class for the purposes of equal protection. Id. at 219 n.19.
174. R.M.G. was not technically deported. However, the result was the same.
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Johns v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.2d
884, 894 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981).
176. As a recent Missouri case demonstrates, the problem may apply to a single parent whose
child is the subject of a disputed adoption, as well. Tony Messenger, Adopted boy at center of
immigration
dispute,
WWW.STLTODAY.COM
(Nov.
10,
2010),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article_3e99fc06-5fe5-56a6-9826-47b140bc41d1.html.
In this news story, undocumented immigrant Encarnacion Romero’s then one year old son was
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The single deportable parent issue threatens litigation for the
Department of Homeland Security each time it arises. Whether the
Department wins or loses, it loses fees and costs every time the issue is
litigated. Among the most troubling potential suits are those regarding
the substantive Due Process rights of parents to raise their children, the
procedural Due Process right to a procedure for determining custody,
and Equal Protection178 for mixed status families.179 Causes of action
180
under the FTCA, or direct constitutional challenges of the practice,
may be more successful than Monica’s,181 given the right set of facts,
and ought not be left out of the calculus.
There is a fair argument that de facto deportation in the problem of
the single deportable parent is unconstitutional under Equal Protection,
Due Process, or as unreasonable search and seizure. Monica herself
made the argument, but its merits were never reached.182 Although
avoiding unconstitutional acts is good for protecting personal liberties,
there are also practical reasons to give unconstitutionality a wide berth.
Firstly, there are costs associated with defending the suit. Further, those
in the position of Monica Castro have a fair argument183 that deportation
of United States citizens is unconstitutional under doctrines protecting
184
the liberty of parents to raise their child.

privately adopted by a local couple after Romero was arrested in an immigration raid. Id. The
couple raised the child for four years before Romero challenged the adoption. Id. She based her
challenge on the couple’s failure to disclose prior criminal convictions, and the clear conflict of
interest that arose when the couple hired an attorney to act on Romero’s behalf. Id. Though not
raised squarely by these facts, the need to determine the best interests of the child, whether for an
adoption or parental custody, prior to deportation is central to the cases of both Romero and
Monica.
177. See supra notes 112 and 118 and accompanying text.
178. Because immigration laws at the federal level are only subject to the rational basis review,
the chances of the single deportable parent prevailing against the Border Patrol are lessened, but not
eliminated. See Wishinie, supra note 145.
179. See supra Part III.D.2.
180. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680.
181. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Monica’s claims in Castro v. United States, 608
F.3d 266 (2010).
182. Castro v. United States, No. C-06-61, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 9, 2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
183. Namely, Monica could argue the law separating her family is subject to strict scrutiny
under the line of cases beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also supra note
162. She could also argue the law as applied to her daughter is subject to heightened scrutiny for
equal protection purposes under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
184. Troxel v. Granville makes it clear parents have a strong right to raise their children free of
interference by the state. Making de facto custody decisions and separating parents from their
children could well be such interference. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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The problem of the single deportable parent also raises the concern
that the Department of Homeland Security is impermissibly acting in the
states’ sphere of family law by making de facto custody determinations.
The Department and the Border Patrol are not empowered to make such
185
even with the sweeping power of the federal
determinations,
government to regulate immigration.186 Unfortunately, both action and
inaction by Border Patrol Agents may result in the same impermissible
187
The best way to avoid this is through
de facto custody determination.
the adoption of a solution that places the right to make a custody
determination where it belongs: with a family court.
Border Patrol Agents like Sanchez need guidance when only one
parent is deportable. Sanchez and his colleagues did their best, but as
the District Court recognized, they were faced with a “difficult
choice.”188 Although the implication of the statutes governing Border
Patrol conduct is that only aliens may be deported,189 at least two courts
have found that deportation may be permissible.190 Further, Border
Patrol Agents need guidance in this area. The status quo forces agents to
make ad hoc de facto custody decisions regarding children in the
position of R.M.G.191 Inconsistent guidance by Circuit is not good
enough, because inconsistency creates the same sort of uncertainty that
led to the de facto deportation of R.M.G.
The Department of Homeland Security can preempt all of these
problems by adopting the proposal contained in this paper. The status
quo still leaves both the problems from the dissent and the majority of
the Castro panel case.192 Further, the practice of deporting-in-fact
United States citizens reflects poorly on the Department in a time of
heated immigration debate. The practice of making de facto custody
decisions also impermissibly treads on the states’ family law dominion.
Finally, Border Patrol Agents need guidance to deal with the problem
effectively, and silent regulations led to the problem in the first place.

185. See Johns v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 894 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981).
186. See supra note 144.
187. See supra note 42.
188. Castro v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, at *23 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2007),
rev’d, 560 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
189. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
190. See Castro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440, and Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266 (5th
Cir. 2010).
191. See Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 392 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d
266 (5th Cir. 2010).
192. Id.
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Closing the Gap in the Immigration Scheme

In the interest of preventing issues in the future, the immigration
regulations must be amended to account for the problem of the single
deportable parent. The proposal itself needs to account for multiple
factors. The most fundamental and important aspect of the proposal is
its requirement of a custody determination where one parent is
deportable and the child and other parent are not. Alternative proposals
are also included in the interests of being thorough, to provide further
context and opportunities for debate.
1. The Proposal
This Article’s proposed solution193 is a Department of Homeland
Security regulation prohibiting deportation of a non-deportable child
when one parent is deportable (under section 8 USC 1227 or any other
applicable provision) and the other is not deportable, unless the
deportable parent has a custody order in his or her favor. In the event
neither parent has a custody order, deportation is stayed pending a valid
custody ruling.194 If neither parent obtains a permanent or temporary
custody order within ninety days195 of a final deportation order,196 the
child will be left in the custody of the non-deportable parent. During the

193. The proposed solution is designed to account for the constitutional rights of both parents
and the child, the Border Patrol agents’ need for guidance, the States’ interest in retaining control
over family law matters, the Department of Homeland Security’s interest in a uniform immigration
system that does not risk litigation, and society’s interest in avoiding punishment of the innocent.
194. Joint physical or joint legal custody may be awarded, but the family court will need to be
wary of the practical concerns facing the family, such a moving the child from parent to parent
across national borders. Professor Thronson’s accommodation model provides the best approach
for a family court to take when considering a joint custody arrangement of some kind. See supra
note 136. Some courts already consider factors like geographical proximity of the parents, which is
particularly appropriate in the context of the problem of the single deportable parent. See supra
note 72.
195. Admittedly, this grace period poses additional burdens on the Department of Homeland
Security, including the possibility of a deportable parent taking advantage of the grace period to
remain in the United States longer. With this in mind, the grace period is limited to ninety days—
the same timeframe generally allowed from a final deportation order to removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231 (a)(1)(A) (2006).
196. A final deportation order may be any of the following: the passing of thirty days from an
Immigration Judge’s oral or written decision, after which a notice of appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals may not be filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38 (b) (2010); a final decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (d)(7) (2010); or a review by the
Attorney General pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (h). This list need not be exhaustive. The purpose
of this final decision rule is to give reasonable certainty that the single deportable parent is in fact
deportable. Otherwise, there is a risk of needless custody determinations regarding a family that
may not be split up.
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ninety-day grace period, the non-deportable parent shall have temporary
custody. If it is determined the non-deportable parent poses a flight risk,
197
If the
reasonable restrictions on travel may be imposed by the court.
parents can come to an agreement on who should have the child, they
198
may sign a waiver allowing one parent to keep the child.
During the grace period, the child will be left in the custody of the
non-deportable parent.199 If that parent is determined to be a flight risk,
the immigration court may order suitable travel restrictions for that
200
The deportable parent, meanwhile, should be detained or
parent.
monitored in the same fashion he or she would be while awaiting
deportation. The deportable parent should be given reasonable visitation
opportunities.
Although R.M.G. and Monica were United States citizens, Omar
and those in his position are entitled to the same constitutional
protections over their rights to the children.201 Any proposed solution
has to account for his rights. Failure to do so will at least pose the same
risk of litigation to the Department of Homeland Security. Accordingly,
the Omars and Monicas of the world need to have a similar opportunity
to seek custody of the child.
The proposed regulation should not limit its protection to natural
parents.202 Nothing about the problem of the single deportable parent is
unique to natural parents, and the proposed solution must account for
this reality. Further, the United States Supreme Court has accorded
protection to nontraditional families.203 Adopted children need to be

197. The restriction on travel may need to be imposed on the child in some cases. The burden
of proof to determine a parent is a flight risk should be on the State, with that burden being a
preponderance of the evidence to compensate. The exact form and nature of the proceedings and
enforcement is outside the scope of this paper, but practicality demands a place to start be
suggested.
198. This is not an impermissible de facto custody determination because the parents are
deciding who keeps the child, not the federal immigration authority. The purpose of this waiver
provision is to alleviate some of the administrative burden on the courts and the Department of
Homeland Security.
199. This is done primarily to avoid having the child detained with the deportable parent, as
R.M.G. was. There is reason to believe that the non-deportable parent could be a better parent
without the custody proceeding.
200. The form and enforcement such restrictions take is beyond the scope of this paper.
201. For discussion of the constitutional rights of undocumented immigrants in child-rearing,
see supra Part III.D.2.
202. That is, biological parents—the birth mother and birth father.
203. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that Due Process forbids
a state from interfering with a grandmother’s right to live with several grandchildren).
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included.204 The Supreme Court has recognized encouraging adoption is
205
a laudable goal, and it is worth protecting and fostering. The simplest
way to account for all of the possible quasi parent-child relationships is
to have a section of the proposed regulation enumerating those
relationships which will be accorded protection. This objective could be
done by adopting section 201 of the Uniform Parentage Act.206 A
provision that allows protection for “parent-child relationships” could
207
also be included.
This solution is preferable because it balances conflicting values208
and accounts for the realities of the political and regulatory processes. It
allows for United States citizen children to remain with their parents in
the event both are deportable; even if the whole family has to be
deported, at least the family stays together.209 A blanket prohibition on
210
and underdeportation of citizens would be both over-inclusive
211
inclusive.
The proposed solution also avoids ad hoc custody
212
determinations, but limits the time the proceedings have to be held up
to ninety days from a final custody determination. Although this
additional process would seem to generate more proceedings, it also
avoids future litigation over constitutional and FTCA suits. This
solution also avoids federalism problems by having state courts make the

204. Children born out of wedlock should not be excluded, either. Moral concerns aside, the
Supreme Court has struck down on Equal Protection grounds several laws that discriminate against
children born out of wedlock. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (“[W]e have
expressly considered and rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of
men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.”);
and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“[V]isiting this
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”) It is unlikely that a regulation
affording protection to “legitimate” children only would pass judicial muster.
205. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (observation made
in the context of permissible state avenues for discouraging abortion).
206. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (amended 2002).
207. The Uniform Probate Code makes a similar effort to account for the changing face of the
American family. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-116 (amended 2008).
208. Specifically, it balances the family courts’ emphasis on the best interests of the child with
the immigration system’s emphasis on regulatory efficiency. See supra note 148 and accompanying
text.
209. This helps avoid the constitutional issues discussed in supra Part III.D.2.
210. Over-inclusive in the sense that a blanket prohibition would allow a citizen parent to keep
the child even though the deportable parent has a custody order. Such a custody order would be
there for a reason, and ought not be disturbed.
211. The same single deportable parent problem arises with children who are naturalized or
otherwise not deportable, so a blanket prohibition would only address one way the issue might arise.
212. That is, custody determinations made without process. This also includes impermissible
de facto custody determinations.
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custody decision, rather than have a federal authority meddle in that
realm. It may be less efficient than continuing to allow ad hoc custody
determinations, but due process and other fundamental rights do not
always follow the path of least resistance, or the path of highest
213
It has to be remembered that this is a stop-gap provision
efficiency.
for the unlikely but heart-wrenching event that other safeguards fail.
This being an unlikely scenario also means it is less of a drain on the
courts’ dockets.
Finally, the proposed solution accounts for the political realities
surrounding its passage. Because immigration is generally unpopular,
the proposal could be attacked for being too soft on immigration.
Regardless of how we may feel about immigration, however, it must be
recognized that the proposal aims to protect United States citizens and
legal residents as well as immigrants. We would expect the same for our
citizens abroad. The opposite argument could also be made: that the
proposal needlessly favors United States citizens. The proposal accounts
for possible favoritism by requiring a determination following a neutral
custody hearing.214
The proposal will also be regulatory, and thus free from the
problems of delay inherent in Congressional action due to bicameralism
and presentment,215 prolonged debate, riders, secret vetoes, and the like.
While there is nothing wrong with vigorous debate over complex and
contentious issues, in this scenario, the problems discussed are best
avoided by the speediest possible resolution.
2. Alternative Proposals
Other potential proposals are not as effective. The alternative
proposals were a blanket prohibition on the de facto deportation of a
United States citizen or national child and a regulation preventing the
Department of Homeland Security from leaving a United States citizen
or national child with the deportable parent when there is a parent who is
not deportable. Both solutions were rejected using the same criteria used
to arrive at the proposed solution.
A blanket prohibition on leaving the child in a deported parent’s
custody fails for two key reasons: it fails to encompass the whole

213. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
214. Any problems with bias once the case reaches family court are not problems with the
proposal itself. For a critique of the family law system’s eagerness to consider immigration status in
determining what is in a child’s best interests, see Thronson, supra note 90, at 47.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
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problem, and it risks disturbing existing family court determinations. A
prohibition on leaving a United States citizen child with the deported
parent ignores the naturalized child. It erects a barrier at the irrelevant
line between citizens, who are here legally, and legal immigrants, who
are also here legally. It should not matter why the child is not
deportable—the fact the child is not deportable is sufficient. The
prohibition also fails to resolve the question of with whom the child
must go. It simply gives the child to the non-deportable parent,
assuming erroneously that immigration status will always determine
which parent is in the child’s best interests.216 Just as bad, it makes an
217
Finally,
impermissible intrusion into the state realm of family law.
simply allowing the non-deportable parent to keep the child could have
the effect on annulling duly decided custody decisions.218
A regulation preventing a deportable parent from taking the child
with them runs into similar problems. While the two alternatives look
similar, the difference is in the functional directness. This solution acts
based on the immigration status of the parent and assigns custody
accordingly, while the blanket prohibition acted based on the
immigration status of the child and allowed the de facto custody decision
to take place by the system’s own silence on the subject. Even more
than a blanket prohibition, this solution intrudes into the area of family
law. Whereas the previous solution only issued a de facto custody
decision if one parent was a United States citizen, this solution grants
custody to any non-deportable parent, thereby increasing the number of
family law matters it usurps. Additionally, while this solution accounts
for existing custody decisions, it gives the deportable parent no chance
to plead his or her case. In so doing it raises constitutional questions for
that parent.219
There are serious problems with the alternative solutions presented,
but this paper is not intended to corner the market on solutions. What

216. Best interests and immigration status may be tenuously linked on rare occasions, but there
is nothing about being undocumented that makes a parent inherently worse for the child. See
Thronson, supra note 79, at 465-68 (discussing why immigration status is almost per se irrelevant to
many family law considerations, including the best interests of the child). For a critique of the
family court system’s occasional practice of custody determinations based on immigration status
without any consideration of the child’s best interests, see Thronson, supra note 79, at 454.
217. See supra notes 145, 151, and 152 and accompanying text.
218. Whether annulling or ignoring the effect of these decisions, the effect is the same. This
would be a more egregious intrusion into the states’ family law territory because the decisions have
already been made by a presumably competent family court. To ignore such decisions would
clearly violate the principles articulated in supra note 145.
219. See supra notes 162-67.
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matters is that a solution needs to be adopted that adequately accounts
for the myriad concerns impacting this intersection of family and
immigration law.
V. CONCLUSION
The consequences are severe for the current gap in immigration
regulations. Parents facing the problem of the single deportable parent
are torn from their children without the benefit of a custody hearing.
Children like R.M.G. are ripped from their parents. Border Patrol agents
are forced to make impossible choices without any guidance. Further,
the Department of Homeland Security must defend lawsuits brought on
by easily avoided tragedies. The harshness of the immigration system is
amplified for those children who have committed no wrong, but have
had the misfortune of being born into a mixed status family.
For those unlucky few who fall through the cracks, the size of the
omission in the regulations matters little. Courts offer no uniform
solution, and are limited to redressing the wrong after the fact.
However, a single regulation could prevent any problems before they
begin. The regulation proposed here is not a dramatic sea change. Nor
is it a radical expansion of immigrants’ rights.220 Instead, it builds on
the existing regulatory and statutory framework to close a gap in the
immigration system. The system has nothing to lose and everything to
gain in adopting the proposed regulation, and the longer the delay the
more likely the recurrence of the problem of the single deportable
parent.
A child was ripped from its mother’s arms so very long ago, and
King Solomon had to summon all of his considerable wisdom to find the
best parent for the child. The problem of the single deportable parent
does not require a solution of his caliber. All it requires is the time and
devotion to sift through the many concerns at issue, and the dedication to
see it through. This country owes that much to those who cannot defend
themselves. And just like Solomon’s solution, no baby actually needs to
be split at the end of the day.

220. Indeed, the regulation is concerned with protecting the rights of legal immigrants and
United States citizens, and aims to curtail undocumented immigrants and citizens alike from
benefitting from a loophole.
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